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INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of high and persistent unemployment in many OECD countries 
and widening wage inequality in some has generated a lively debate as to the 
culprits. In particular, much research interest and political debate has focused on 
the question of the role of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in 
accounting for these phenomena. Views are divided on this question. The OECD 
lobs Study reviewed the available evidence on the impact of trade and FDI on 
employment and relative wages and concluded that it was very small relative to 
other influences such as technological progress. But this conclusion has been 
disputed by other authors. 
The debate has been hampered by the fact that most of the empirical work on 
the topic relates to the case of the United States whereas the labour market 
phenomena in question are common to many other OECD countries. Consequently, 
this paper seeks to add another country case study by examining the evidence for 
France. This example is particularly pertinent given the intense interest that the 
topic has evoked in France recently. 
The past two years have witnessed an increasingly heated debate among 
French policy-makers about the impact of foreign trade and FDl on French jobs. The 
debate has been fuelled by reports suggesting that foreign trade and capital out- 
flows have dramatically reduced the number of jobs available to French workers.' I t  
has revealed a widespread and strong belief among French policy-makers (and 
many industrialists as well) that imports from "dissimilar" countries (i.e. countries 
with wages significantly lower than French wages) are much more costly in terms of 
numbers of French jobs "lost" than imports from "similar" countries and are lead- 
ing to a substantial decline in French wages, especially for low-skilled labour. 
This paper aims at providing more information about the impact of trade and 
capital flows on French employment and wages. As underlined by Baldwin (1994). 
most of the recent empirical literature on these issues tests the hypothesis that 
growing integration of the world economy is driving a process of worldwide factor 
price equalisation - hence driving down the relative wage of unskilled labour to 
skilled labour in OECD countries. This paper does not follow this approach because 
it seems rather extreme on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, factor 
price equalisation requires stringent assumptions if  the theorem is to hold. For 
example, the existence of large labour migration or capital flows reflects the lack of 
effective factor price equalisation (Woodland, 1982). Second, French labour markets 
do not exhibit the flexible functioning which is necessary for a rapid process of 
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factor price equalisation. Indeed, evidence which would reveal ongoing factor price 
equalisation at  work in France is just not there, as  shown below.' 
Rather, the paper relies on an approach based on three other lessons sug- 
gested by pure trade theory. First, trade has a small impact (if  any) on the total 
number of jobs available in an economy: total unemployment is mainly driven by 
macroeconomic forces and the functioning of labour and product markets itself. 
Second, changes in the relative prices of traded goods and services have a noticea- 
ble impact on the  relative wages paid to skilled labour by import-competing and 
export industries - rather than on the relative wage paid t o  unskilled labour by both 
industries. Lastly, capital outflows and inflows are based on very complex motives: 
as a result, simple relations - such a s  a decline of domestic jobs a s  a result of 
capital outflows - are unlikely. These lessons lead to the  following conclusion: most 
of t h e  employment and wage developments that the French debate on trade policy 
focuses on are more related t o  domestic causes than to international trade and FDI. 
The paper is organised a s  follows. The first section examines the relationships 
between trade and employment in the French case. It starts by looking a t  the link 
between exports and employment: it shows the  extent to which during the  last 
15 years, world demand for French exports ( the derived demand for French labour 
by foreign consumers) has driven French growth. Then it takes into account imports 
by estimating the  number of French jobs lost because French consumers prefer 
foreign goods ( the derived "non-demand" for French labour by French consumers). 
Combining these two derived demands for French labour allows us  to make an 
estimate of the net impact of foreign trade on French employment. As expected by 
the theory, the estimated net impact of trade on total employment is very small and 
(for most of the period examined) positive. But the net impact on employment by 
industry can be substantial in both directions - negative a s  well a s  positive. 
The section on trade, terms of trade, wages and skills (see below) explores the 
relationships between trade and the composition of employment defined in terms 
of skill requirements - shifting the focus to the  links between trade and relative 
wages. It provides two main results. First, trade is unlikely to have a straightforward 
impact on the relative wages of French skilled and unskilled labour because France 
is not characterised by a high relative endowment of skilled labour (with respect to 
unskilled labour) when compared with the rest of the  world: i f  she exports relatively 
skill-intensive goods and services t o  certain countries, s h e  exports relatively 
unskilled labour-intensive goods and services to other countries. The second result 
is that, by contrast, there are substantial differences in the  evolution (from 1984 to 
1991) of the relative wages paid to skilled labour: the wages paid to skilled labour 
by export industries have increased substantially with respect t o  the wages paid t o  
skilled labour by import-competing industries. 
Lastly, the section on FDI, domestic investment, and jobs examines French FDI 
flows and provides three results. First, the shares of French outward and inward FDI 
flows in domestic gross investments are small for most industrial sectors - and in 
particular, for those exhibiting net job losses. Second, FDI flows tend to  have the 
same geographical pattern a s  trade flows (with a dominant proportion of flows 2.U 
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towards and from the EC and other OECD countries) and job-contracting industries 
are no exception to this fact. Third, job-contracting industries do not invest in the 
rest of the world more than other industries, and they tend to receive as much 
foreign investment as other sectors. 
THE LINKS BETWEEN TRADE AND TOTAL EMPLOYMENT 
Trade theory does not predict a strong link between trade openness and the 
aggregate level of employment even when employment is not fully flexible - for 
instance, when factors of production are specific to industries (Jones, 1971) or when 
domestic factors are not flexible because of the existence of minimum wages 
(Brecher, 1974).3 
Indeed, Figure 1 clearly suggests that there is no strong link between trade and 
total unemployment. Between 1976 and 1992. the French unemployment rate 
increased by almost 300 per cent, whereas the openness ratio (defined as the sum 
of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP) of the French economy 
increased by only 10 to 20 per cent. These diverging evolutions suggest that French 
unemployment is more related to domestic macroeconomic variables and/or to 
poorly functioning labour and product markets than to foreign trade.4 
Figure I. French unemployment and openness 
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I. The openness index is defined as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDF 
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In this  context, this section examines more closely two issues: the link between 
exports and jobs, and the net impact of trade on employment. It analyses not only 
the links with aggregate employment but it also focuses on individual industries: 
although foreign trade is not expected to have an impact on total employment, it is 
expected to have an impact on its composition (the specialisation process requires 
some reallocation of labour between industries). 
The analysis is based on input-output accounting methods. The Annex 
describes these methods and their limits. However, these methods have a crucial 
advantage for our purposes: their capacity to link political and economic aspects. 
Indeed, they provide results easy to interpret in terms of votes (jobs mean votes) 
and are thus useful for understanding the public debate. And, they offer a close 
approximation to the results of standard trade theory, as  underlined by Krugman 
and Lawrence ( 1  993). 
French jobs supported by exports 
In the context of GATT negotiations such as the Uruguay Round, each negotiat- 
ing country tries hard to improve market access for its exporters. This focus on 
exports is explained by the fact that policy-makers aim at expanding the derived 
demand for domestic labour. This first look at the possible links between trade and 
jobs relies on the method developed by Davis (1992) which is based on the concept 
of value-added multipliers within an input-output accounting framework [see the 
Annex for a detailed description of this method). All the figures presented in the 
section are in constant prices ( I  980 French franc prices) and are based on data 
including service industries as well as manufacturing and agricultural sectors. 
Exports: the engine of French growth 
Table 1 shows the important role of exports in French GDP and the degree to 
which exports of goods and services have been increasingly the engine of growth. It 
suggests that the prerequisite for an impact of trade on jobs - the existence of large 
trade flows - is met by the French case. 
The share of exports of goods and services in total GDP has increased from 
20 to 27 per cent between 1977 and 1992. However, export growth did not evolve 
smoothly over the period: between 1982 and 1986 it was erratic, whereas it was 
consistently positive before this period and has been since. 
lncreases of exports represented about 37 per cent (on average) of GDP 
increases in the late 1970s. and almost 75 per cent for the period 1987-92 (exceed- 
ing 100 per cent in 1991 and 1992). That export growth has represented a very large 
proportion of (or even surpassed) GDP growth underscores the extent to which 
exports have been a crucial growth engine in France (a feature shared with the vast 
majority of other OECD countries). 
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1977-92 2.1 
1977-81 2.5 
1982-86 1.1 
1987-92 4.0 
Table 1 .  Annual shares and changes in shares in real French GDP 
and total employment supported by French exports 
1 .o 0.8 4 909 
2. I 2.0 5 723 
0.1 0.3 5 116 
2.1 2.2 4 120 
Export: share 
of total GDP 
% 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
I 985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
20.0 
20.5 
21.3 
21.5 
22.1 
21.1 
21.8 
23.0 
23.0 
22.1 
22.3 
23.0 
24.4 
25.0 
25.8 
27. I 
cgr b 
Export-supported 
jobsa 
Total number '000 Share of employment 
3 211.5 14.8 
3 253.0 14.9 
n..a. n..a. 
3 392.4 15.5 
3 494.4 16.0 
3 299.9 15.1 
3 395.9 '15.5 
3 503.8 16.2 
3 457.5 16.0 
3 307.4 15.2 
3 259.8 15.0 
3 298.1 15.0 
3 425.0 15.4 
3 539.7 15.7 
3 633.9 16.2 
3 730.5 16.7 
cgr * cgr b 
Number of jobs 
supported by I Bio FF 
of exports 
6 210 
5 940 
n..a. 
5 613 
5 576 
5 356 
5 316 
5 126 
4 964 
4 818 
4 608 
4 314 
4 065 
3 989 
3 944 
3 801 
avg 
The impact of exports on jobs: an economy-wide view 
Exports support "direct" jobs: a French car exported to the rest of the world 
embodies a direct content of French labour. In addition to this direct derived 
demand for labour, exports also support "indirect" jobs: the French exported car 
has required the production of intermediate inputs (steel plates, tires, etc.), capital 
goods (plant and equipment) and service inputs in France - all derived demands for 
French labour which should also be taken into a c c o ~ n t . ~  
Table 1 provides a crude estimate of the sum of direct and indirect jobs 
supported by total French exports: this amounted to over 3.7 million jobs in  1992 
- about 16 per cent more than in 1977. Another way to express these results is 
provided by an estimate of the average number of jobs supported by exports of FF 
I billion: roughly 4 000 jobs in 1990 (i.e. roughly 25 000 jobs for USSI billion which 
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is close to the US figure of 19 000 jobs for US$I billion estimated by Davis).6 
Table 1 shows that export-supported jobs represent an increasing share of total 
civilian employment - up from almost 15 per cent in 1977 to almost 17 per cent 
in 1992. 
Export impact on jobs: a sectoral view 
Since much of the concern in the debate on the impact of trade on employ- 
ment is fuelled by sectoral arguments, Table 2 decomposes the export-supported 
jobs into four broad sectors: manufacturing, agriculture, energy and services. It 
provides three main results: 
First, the shares of export-supported jobs in the labour force vary widely among 
these sectors. In 1992 (the latest year for which data are available), half of the jobs 
in French manufacturing industry depended upon exports - compared with 35 per 
cent in agriculture, 25 per cent in energy and only 7 per cent in services. 
Second. the growth rates of the export-supported jobs vary widely among the 
four sectors and over time. The only sector in which they are continuously (and 
highly) positive is the services sector. 
Third, these share increases occurred in very different employment contexts. In 
industry, agriculture and energy, there has been a strong decline in total jobs 
(annual compound growth rates of -1.9, -2.8 and -1.2, respectively) accompanied 
by small increases or decreases of export-supported jobs (at annual rates of 0.1, 
-0.1 and -0.9 per cent, respectively). All these trends are in sharp contrast with what 
has occurred in services. In this sector, employment has increased by an annual 
Table 2. Export-supported jobs by sector 
Total economy Manufacturing Agriculturea Energy Services 
Shares in total civilian employment 
1977-92 
1977-81 
1982-86 
1987-92 
15.5 43.2 30.4 24.2 5.5 
15.3 39.3 26.2 23.7 4.9 
15.6 42.9 29.3 24. I 5.5 
15.7 46.0 34.0 24.7 6.0 
Annual compound growth rates 
1977-92 
1977-81 
1982-86 
1987-92 
I .O 0. I -0. I -0.9 4.0 
2. I 0.8 3.4 0.2 4.9 
0. I -1.3 I .7 -1.7 2.1 
2.7 2.3 -1.3 - I  .8 6.5 
a1 Agriculture includes forestry. fishing, food industries. 
b) The year 1979 is not available. 
Source: INSEE: Cornptes de la nation. Author's computations. 4 
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French exports to 
growth rate of 1.2 per cent whereas export-supported iobs have increased at a 4 per 
cent rate. 
Export-supported jobs 
Export impact on jobs: a country view 
As mentioned in the introduction, there is a widespread belief among French 
policy-makers that trade with countries with very different labour intensities (coun- 
tries with "low" wages) is more costly in terms of jobs than trade with countries 
with similar labour intensities (i.e. the other OECD countries). It is thus interesting 
to redo the exercise of computing export-supported iobs for French trade flows 
disaggregated by trading partners. 
Rest of Other OECD world 
DAEsa Other 
EC Other OECD 
I I 
Millions US dollars Thousands 
I985 
1986 
I987 
I988 
I989 
1990 
1991 
I992 
52.5 18.5 
69.1 21.8 
86.6 25.7 
99.7 29.3 
105.7 30.0 
131.5 34.9 
134.4 35.0 
145.5 37.0 
2.4 21.3 I 858.5 
2.6 25.2 1 872.2 
3.3 27.0 I 920.1 
4. I 29.2 I 964.8 
4.9 32.6 2 004.0 
6.1 36.2 2 107.8 
6.5 33.4 2 234.2 
7.8 36.3 2 279.9 
737. I 
702.9 
684.8 
696.1 
712.0 
732.6 
699.4 
726.8 
618.9 
544.0 
505.3 
502.8 
564.0 
543.7 
545.7 
573.8 
~ ~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _  
Annual compound growth rates 
85-92 15.7 10.4 18.1 7.9 3.0 -0.2 -1.1 
81-92 10.9 7.5 18.6 6. I 3.5 I .2 2.6 
Percentage of total exportsb Percentage of tOtal export-supported iobs 
I985 
1986 
I987 
1988 
I989 
I990 
1991 
I992 
51.6 18.2 
55.3 17.5 
58.4 17.3 
59.4 17.5 
58.9 16.7 
60.7 16.1 
61.9 16.1 
61.7 15.7 
2.4 21.0 
2. I 20. I 
2.2 18.2 
2.4 17.4 
2.7 18.2 
2.8 16.1 
3.0 15.4 
3.3 15.4 
53.8 
56.6 
58.9 
59.6 
58.5 
59.5 
61.5 
61.1 
21.3 17.9 
21.3 16.4 
21.0 15.5 
21.1 15.2 
20.8 16.5 
20.7 15.4 
19.2 15.0 
19.5 15.4 
al DAEs (Dynamic Asian Economiesl: Hong Kong. Indonesia. Korea. Malaysia. Singapore. Taiwan-Roc, Thailand. 
bl Totals do not add to 100 (see footnote 7 in the text). 
Source: INSEE. Comptes de la nation. IMF, Trade data. Author's computations. E 
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Table 3 presents a breakdown of French trade by trading partners in four major 
zones in order to address these  issue^.^ Two zones involve countries relatively 
similar to France: the EC countries (with which French trade flows are not hindered 
by trade barriers) and the other OECD zone. In addition, there is the Rest of World 
(ROW) zone which can be further divided between the Dynamic Asian Economies 
(DAEs) and the other ROW countries. During the period 1987-91, export flows shown 
in Table 3 (they concern all goods and services recorded by the IMF) exhibit very 
different annual compound growth rates: more than 18 per cent to the DAEs. almost 
12 per cent to the EC, 8 per cent to the other OECD countries and less than 6 per 
cent to the rest of the ROW zone. 
Table 3 also presents the computed export-supported jobs. These results do 
not support the above-mentioned widespread belief, but they match well the results 
expected from standard economic analysis. In particular, French export-supported 
jobs for all goods and services have increased at a higher rate with the ROW zone 
than with the other OECD zone. This evolution may reflect ongoing trade liberalisa- 
tion as  well as domestic growth differentials: during the late 1980s. the ROW zone 
experienced substantial unilateral trade liberalisations at the level of individual 
countries, such as Mexico, or at the level of regions, such as in Pacific Asia. 
lobs and trade: a wider perspective 
In sharp contrast to the above approach which makes sense only in the context 
of trade negotiations, economic theory shows that gains from trade flow from 
imports: French consumers prefer foreign goods and services because they are less 
expensive than French corresponding items or because they are better designed to 
suit their tastes than French goods and services. As a result of the choices of French 
consumers, there is less demand for French labour. Combining these two forces 
- the foreign derived demand for French labour and the French derived “non- 
demand” for French labour - allows us to estimate the net impact of trade on 
French jobs. 
French trade and net job creation 
According to standard trade theory, the economic impact of foreign trade is on 
real incomes, not on total employment. However, since trade is closely related to 
growth opportunities existing in the entire world as well as in the country under 
consideration, one should not be surprised if trade has an impact on total 
employment. 
Table 4 allows us to quantify this impact in the case of France. It gives the 
number of jobs (as a percentage of total employment) “created” by exports and the 
number of jobs “lost” by imports as well as the net number of jobs. These estimates 
are derived by using an accounting method (see Annex). It leads to  three 
observations. 971 
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Table 4. Net job creation by trade in goods and servicesa 
Per cent of total French civilian employment 
World 
M X Net 
1980 
1981 
I982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
I986 
I987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
-14.2 15.5 1.2 
-14.0 16.0 2.0 
-14.2 15.1 0.9 
-I 3.8 15.5 I .8 
-13.7 16.2 2.4 
-13.9 16.0 2 1  
-14.4 15.2 0.8 
-14.9 15.0 0.0 
-15.3 15.0 -0.2 
-15.7 15.4 -0.3 
-16.2 15.7 -0.5 
-16.6 16.2 -0.4 
-16.5 16.7 0. I 
Averages 
80-92 -14.9 15.7 0.8 
87-92 -15.9 15.7 -0.2 
a1 Estimates based on 81 sectors. 
Intra-EC 
M X Net 
-9.2 9.1 -0.06 
-9.6 9.5 -0.03 
-9.6 10.1 0.50 
-9.6 10.3 0.70 
-9.49 9.77 0.28 
Extra-EC 
M X Net 
4 . 5  6.3 -0.2 
4 . 7  6.2 -0.4 
-7.0 6. I -0.9 
4 . 9  6.3 -0.6 
4 . 7 5  4.22 -0.5 
Source: INSEE. Comptes de la nation. Author's computations 
First, as  expected, the net impact of trade on jobs is modest. It is on average 
about 0.8 per cent of French total employment, that is, almost 170 000 jobs 
-though it peaked at 2.4 per cent in 1984 (about 450 000 jobs). 
Second. trade tends to be a net creator of jobs. In only four out of the fifteen 
years for which estjmates are available was there a negative net impact of trade o n  
jobs. These negative figures are very small: they never exceeded half a percentage 
point of total employment (less than 100 000 jobs in 1990). 
Lastly, all four years in which trade led to net job losses are clustered in the 
period 1988-91. This may help to explain the increase in protectionist sentiment 
observed in France during recent years -though it is somewhat hard to believe that 
French politicians could be sensitive to such small figures.8 
A breakdown of net job creation by sector 
Table 5 presents a breakdown of net job creation by sector. Rather than present 
all sectors, we have chosen to focus on the extremes, i.e. the ten sectors with the  
highest net job gains and the ten sectors with the highest net job losses. The Former 
set is characterised by higher wages (on average) than the latter. I f  one excludes K% 
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Table 5 .  Net job gains and losses by selected sectors ('000), 1992 
Average 
wages 
'000 FR 
Zones 
Industriesa European Other 
World Community OECD 
OPEC 
zone 
The ten sectors with the highest net job gains 
ROW 
Agriculture 
Car 
Aircraft 
Services to firms 
Electric machines 
Tyres 
Maritime transports 
Specialty chemicals 
Foundry 
Railway equipement 
147.3 154.3 6.9 -24.6 10.6 
45.0 28.1 1.2 10.0 5.6 175.3 
42.2 0.2 11.7 22.7 7.6 256.0 
39.2 18.1 7.1 8.8 5.2 
23.4 4.9 -1.5 13.3 6.7 179.6 
19.8 12.9 3.4 1.2 2.3 169.0 
14.4 0.7 9.6 2.7 1.4 
14.2 3.7 1.1 7.4 2.0 214.5 
13.2 5.7 -0.2 4.9 2.9 156.9 
12.9 9.7 0.7 I .7 0.8 183.1 
The ten sectors with the highest net job losses 
Plastics 
Construction 
Crude oil 
Scientific equipment 
Natural gas 
Shoes 
Fishing 
Coal 
Hosiery 
Office machines 
All sectors 
-18.3 
-19.2 
-22.3 
-23.6 
-24.7 
-25.1 
-25.9 
-26.7 
-29.4 
-34.4 
30.9 
-13.8 
- I  .4 
-1.6 
-7.1 
-3.9 
-14.8 
-8.5 
-1.2 
-7.7 
6.4 
124.3 
-5.2 -0.8 1.4 149.3 
-3.1 -5.2 -9.4 
-3.4 -6.1 - 1 1 . 1  
-18.9 -0.5 2.9 159.4 
-3.7 -6. I -11.1 
2.8 -12.1 -1.0 124.3 
-12.7 -4.6 -0. I 
-16.8 -8.0 -0.7 212.5 
-4.8 -15.6 -1.2 120.5 
-31.8 -9.7 0.7 220.7 
- 1 19.7 -32.3 58.6 180.0 
a) Sectors are defined in terms of French industrial Classification NAP 90. Agriculture excludes forestry. fishing and 
food industries. 
bJ Average waaes lsectoral labour costs as defined bv SESSI divided bv sectoral emdovrnentl are available onlv for - . .  . .  
industrial sectors. 
Source: INSEE. Comptes de la nation. Ministere de I'lndustrie (SESSI). Author's computations. 
agriculture, there is a relative balance in terms of size between the two sets of 
sectors. 
Looking at the set of sectors creating net jobs, one can distinguish between 
sectors which create net jobs essentially through intra-EC trade (for instance, agri- 
culture or railway equipment) and sectors which create net jobs through extra-EC 
trade. Agriculture shows the most marked contrast: net gains from intra-OECD 
trade, but net losses from trade with the rest of the world - a feature which may 
help to  explain why it was one of the leading members of the protectionist coalition 
in France during the debate on the Uruguay Round. m 
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Sectors with net lob losses can be distinguished by two criteria. A few of them 
are natural-resources based, such as  coal, fishing and natural gas, with heavy losses 
arising from extra-EC trade. By contrast, traditional industries in difficulties 
(hosiery, shoes) are characterised by high losses arising from both intra-EC trade 
and non-OECD trade. 
A breakdown of net job creation b y  trading zone 
In addition to examining net job gains and losses by sector, it is also instruc- 
tive to examine the breakdown of net gains and losses by trading partners. 
Table 4 shows a different impact of intra-EC trade and extra-EC trade on French 
jobs. Net job losses seem to be more associated with extra-EC trade and net job 
gains with intra-EC trade for the period 1989-92 (the only years for which French 
National Accounts provide consistent trade data for the world and for the EC). This 
observation requires a more thorough examination. 
Table 6 relies on a different set of trade data than those used so far. This data 
set (provided by the French Customs) permits a distinction to be drawn between the  
EC zone and the other OECD zone for the period 1980-92, and between these zones 
and the OPEC and ROW zones for the period 1985-92. Trade with the OPEC zone is 
associated with high net job creation, illustrating the fact that France imports non - 
competing goods from this zone. The EC zone also shows net job creation - except 
for 1989 and 1990 - at the level of disaggregation c~ns ide red .~  Lastly. trade with 
both the other OECD and the ROW zones exhibits a negative impact on jobs. It is 
Table 6 .  Estimates of net job gains and losses by trading zones 
Thousand of jobs 
~ ~ 
European Other 
Community OECD world ROW OPEC 
I980 
1981 
1985 
I986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
I992 
Averages 
80-92 
87-92 
269.4 
442.9 
452.0 
183.9 
6.7 
-51.0 
-61.3 
-104.4 
-88.2 
30.9 
108.1 
-44.6 
99. I 
57.6 
I 17.6 
36.4 
4.7 
10.2 
-49.7 
-49.2 
80.5 
124.3 
43.2 
20. I 
-99.9 
-69.5 
70.0 
12.7 
-21.9 
-44.2 
-62.7 
-80.2 
- 1 59.6 
- I  19.7 
-57.5 
-81.4 
n.a. n.a. 
n.a. n.a. 
126.9 137.5 
45.6 89.2 
-28.2 52. I 
-56.8 39.8 
7.5 43.6 
-29.6 54 6 
-56.1 47.0 
-32.3 58.6 
-2.3 52.2 
-32.6 49.3 
Source: NSEE. Comptes de la nation. French customs. Author's computations. 1100 
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noteworthy that trade with the ROW zone has a less strong impact in terms of net 
job losses for a given amount of trade than does trade with the other OECD zone - a 
fact that does not match with current French preconceptions. 
Comparison with other studies 
Before turning to the section on trade, terms of trade, wages and skills, it is 
useful to compare the results of this section with the main results provided by the 
few available papers which have examined the impact of trade on French labour. 
Vimont (1993). who used a methodology similar to our approach (at a less disaggre- 
gated industrial classification), ended up with an estimate of net job creation of 
106 000 jobs in 1991, compared with our estimate of a net job destruction of 
88 000 jobs. However, this discrepancy can be easily explained by the treatment of 
the tourism sector: Vimont estimated net job gains from tourism at  about 
274 000 jobs whereas we were obliged to ignore the trade aspects of this industry 
because they were not included in the data set provided by the French National 
Accounts. 
Two papers by Mathieu and Sterdyniak (1994) and by the Direction de  la 
Prhision (1994) lead to results more radically different from our estimates: they 
suggest net job losses, ranging from 190 000 to 330 000, related to trade with 
developing countries alone (our corresponding result is 56 000 net job losses for 
1991). This difference stems from the fact that both papers assume that one franc of 
imports from developing countries is equivalent to more than one franc of domestic 
production in the sense that one franc of imports represents, say, two T-shirts, 
whereas one franc of domestic production represents only one T-shirt. As a result, 
both papers assume that one franc of imports should eliminate more than one franc 
of domestic production: using data on imports and domestic production of shoes, 
both papers state that one thousand francs of imports (say, two pairs of shoes) 
should eliminate two thousand francs of domestic production (which correspond to 
the same quantity of two pairs of shoes). 
Even if one accepts this assumption about the substitution of imported to 
domestic shoes and the ratio of two to one (see the Annex for a discussion about 
this ratio), the results offered by these two studies are subject to the following 
remarks. These authors have estimated domestic prices from export unit values and 
import prices from import uni t  values. These estimates are likely to be biased 
towards overestimates in the case of domestic prices and underestimates in the 
case of import prices. The second bias is the most severe: products like clothing, 
shoes and electronics are subject to quotas, and quota premiums have been 
ignored in these computations (in other words, import unit values are likely to be 
depressed by the expected quota premium). Small changes in these biases could 
change the final results radically. For instance, if export unit values are 10 per cent 
higher than domestic prices, and if  import unit values are 30 per cent lower than 
import-competing prices (a plausible premium for quotas), the price differential 
would be only 1.5 instead of 2.1 which is the differential adopted by these two 1011 
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studies. With such a lower price differential, their upper-bound estimate of net job 
losses would decrease from 330 000 to 107 000 jobs (close to our estimate). 
TRADE, TERMS OF TRADE, WAGES AND SKILLS 
The previous section focuses on quantity relationships - namely the impact of 
trade flows on (aggregate and sectoral) levels of employment. Such an approach 
treats jobs with different levels of skills as similar and ignores the role of relative 
prices of goods and services (the terms of trade) on factor rewards. As a result, it 
cannot address the other crucial issue raised in the debate about the Uruguay 
Round: does French trade (in particular, trade with countries with low wages) tend 
to depress French wages? This general question leads to two very different 
approaches. 
The first approach assumes that labour is very mobile between industries. In 
such a context, the impact of trade on French wages is mostly determined by the 
level of skills and is independent of the sectors involved. If  France is relatively 
abundant in skilled labour (and if the terms of trade of skill-intensive goods 
increase), the wages paid to French unskilled labour should decline. The evidence 
provided below does not support the existence of this relation. 
This negative result suggests the adoption of an alternative approach which 
recognises that labour is relatively immobile between sectors, especially in the 
short run. More precisely, skilled labour is assumed to be ”specific” to an industry: 
it is less mobile between industries than unskilled labour. In this context, the 
specific-factor model of trade predicts that changes in the terms of trade will have a 
more noticeable impact on the relative wages paid to skilled labour by export 
sectors and by import-competing industries respectively than on the relative wages 
of unskilled labour (see Annex). Evidence provided below tends to support this 
result, although it also shows that French relative wages are heavily influenced by 
specific features of the domestic labour market - in particular, minimum wages and 
early retirement schemes. 
Trade and wages 
is based on two different interpretations about the nature of French trade. 
The assertion that trade depresses the average wage of unskilled French labour 
Trade patterns and average wages 
The first (and most frequent) interpretation is that trade with low-wage coun- 
tries has a depressing effect on the French average wage (first because workers in 
these countries allegedly compete directly with French unskilled workers, then 
because competition in terms of wages allegedly spreads to skilled labour). This 
interpretation does not generally rely upon the traditional “factor price equalisa- 
tion” argument - and indeed it does not need to do so (Krueger, 1977). 
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However, such a direct relation between trade patterns and the average French 
wage has to take into account the fact that France trades not only with countries 
with lower wages, but also with countries with higher wages. I f  trade flows have any 
impact on the average wage, there is no reason to exclude France’s trading partners 
with higher wages from the analysis. 
As suggested by Krugman and Lawrence (1993), one simple figure can capture 
the whole argument: it is the average wage of France‘s trading partners weighted by 
French imports from all her partners. Using the estimates of iabour costs provided 
by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics suggests that the weighted wage faced by 
France is close to one. This result flows from the fact that almost half of French 
trade is with countries with higher wages - the other half being with countries with 
lower wages (and the lower the trading partners’ wages are, the less important are 
trade flows between France and the trading partners in question). 
Terms of trade and relative wages 
The second interpretation states that French trade reduces the relative wages 
paid to French unskilled and skilled labour, drawing on the traditional “factor price 
equalisation” approach. This interpretation rests on two crucial hypotheses: 
i) France should be relatively well endowed with skilled labour (relatively to 
unskilled labour) vis-2-vis ROW (as a whole); and ii) the relative price of skill- 
intensive goods should have increased. 
The first hypothesis cannot be taken for granted. France is both relatively well 
endowed with skilled labour vis-2-vis certain countries and relatively rich in 
unskilled labour vis-2-vis other trading partners.1° 
A simple extension of the work done in the section on the links between trade 
and total employment provides evidence supporting the ambiguity of French rela- 
tive endowments. Fol~owing the approach suggested by Borjas, Freeman and Katz 
(1992) (see Annex for details), it is possible to calculate the skilled and unskilled 
labour “embodied” in French trade, i.e. to estimate a trade content in terms of 
“labour efficiency units” defined as jobs weighted by a variable mirroring the level 
of skills (namely, average wages). If French exports were systematically intensive in 
skilled labour, their content in terms of labour efficiency units should be higher 
than their content in jobs. And if  French imports were systematically intensive in 
unskilled labour, their content in terms of labour efficiency units should be lower 
than their content in iobs.I1 
Table 7 presents the skill embodiment of French trade based on this method. It 
shows that there is no clearcut evolution in the French case: both exports and 
imports have contents in labour efficiency units higher than their contents in jobs. 
That leads to the conclusion that differences in relative endowments between 
France and ROW are not large to the point that they can generate noticeable 
changes in French relative (skilled/unskilled) wages. 
It is also noticeable from Table 7 that French exports and imports have con- 
tents in labour efficiency units higher than their contents in jobs roughly in the -@? 
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Table 7. Implicit labour input in goods and services trade flowsa 
As a % of total 
French labour input in number of jobs 
Import Export Net 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
Averages 
87-92 
85-86 
As a % of total 
French labour input in efficiency units 
Import Export Net 
2. I 
0.9 
0.1 
-0.2 
-0.1 
-0.3 
-0.2 
0.4 
-14.3 
-14.8 
-I 5.3 
-15.7 
-16.1 
-16.6 
-16.9 
-16.8 
-20.6 
-21.6 
-22.6 
-22.9 
-23.4 
-24. I 
-24.1 
n.a.8 
16.4 
15.7 
15.4 
15.5 
15.9 
16.2 
16.6 
17. I 
23.7 3.1 
22.8 1.2 
22.5 -0.1 
22.2 -0.6 
22.9 -0.5 
23.3 -0.8 
24.1 -0.5 
n.a. n.a. 
14.5 16.0 1.5 1 2 1 . 1  23.2 2.1 
16.2 16.1 -0.1 23.5 23.0 -0.5 
a )  These estimates are based on 38 sectors. The results are slightly different from those of Table 4 because of this 
change in the level of disaggregation. 
Source: INSEE. Cornptes de la nation and DADS. Author’s computations. 
same proportion. As a result, the net trade impact in terms of “labour efficiency 
units” is still small when compared with total employment (expressed itself in 
terms of labour efficiency units) though it is higher than the net trade impact in 
terms of jobs. In sum,  the conclusion suggested by the section on the links between 
trade and total employment (above) (that the trade impact on total employment is 
small) still appears to be valid when allowance is made for the skill composition of 
the work force. 
Skill-intensities of French industries 
The previous discussion can be usefully completed by ranking French indus- 
tries by wage levels. Such a ranking mirrors the income gains from trade. And if one 
assumes that the average wage in relatively skilled-labour-intensive industries is 
higher than the average wage in relatively unskilled-labour-intensive sectors, it is 
also a ranking in terms of skill contents which can be seen as  a test confirming what 
has just been said about French relative endowments. Wage data consistent with 
the trade data used in the section on the links between trade and total employment 
(above) have been collected for 81 industries (see Annex for details). For the sake of 
simplicity, Table 8 aggregates the 81 industries into three groups: export industries, 
import-competing sectors and non-trading industries (defined as those which have 
no or very small trade flows - de fac to ,  only services industries).12 
1104 
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Table 8. Relative wages among French industries, 1985-1991 
Industries 1985 1986 1987 
A. All sectors (except agriculture) 
World 
Import-competing 103.3 101.2 
Exporting 100.3 102.4 
Non trading 77.9 82.1 
European Community 
Import-competing 101.6 104.1 
Exporting 97.7 93.1 
Other OECD 
Import-competing 
Exporting 
Import-competing 
Exporting 
ROW 
102.2 104.3 
98.0 98.3 
97.6 97.4 
101.8 101.8 
B. Manufacturing sector (including food processing) 
World 
Import-competing 99.2 97.0 
Exporting 101.3 104.4 
Non trading 95.2 101.1 
Import-competing 96.3 97.9 
European Community 
Exporting 105.0 99.6 
Other OECD 
Import-competing 
Exporting 
102.5 104.0 
96.1 96. I 
ROW 
Import-competing 98.6 98.6 
Exporting 100.0 100.4 
102.8 
100.3 
76.6 
104.5 
93.6 
101.2 
98.8 
98.1 
101.9 
98.2 
104.3 
90.9 
99.4 
98.6 
102.0 
95.4 
100.3 
100.0 
~~ 
I988 1989 1991a 
101.5 
105.1 
72.4 
104.2 
99.6 
101.2 
101.4 
98.4 
106.2 
98.1 
105.1 
92.0 
100.8 
99.1 
103.0 
95.7 
99.8 
102.2 
102.0 
102.1 
73. I 
102.6 
100.4 
101.1 
99.3 
99.6 
103.5 
98.5 
104.1 
89.2 
98.1 
106.9 
103.4 
93.2 
101.4 
101.3 
102.1 
105.6 
66.0 
101.6 
103.3 
104.5 
98.5 
101.0 
106.2 
98.5 
104.5 
85.0 
98. I 
108.8 
103.4 
93.0 
97.4 
103.5 
aJ Data for 1990 are not available. See text for details. 
bJ Index 100 for the whole economy (agriculture excluded). 
CJ Index 100 for the whole manufacturing (including food processing). 
Source: INSEE. Comptes de la nation and DADS. Authors’ computations. 
Table 8 illustrates French income gains from trade. Workers in export manufac- 
turing sectors gain on average 6 per cent more than workers in import-competing 
manufacturing sectors (taking into account services).I3 Combined with the result 
From the section on the links between trade and total employment (above), this  
result mirrors the saying about the impact of freer trade: “Better jobs rather than 
more jobs.” 
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This result requires a caveat: the observed link between French exports and 
wages may also reflect protection. For instance, trade barriers in textiles and 
apparel are imposed by all OECD countries on exports from the newly industrial 
and developing countries. Such trade barriers exclude non-OECD competitors from 
OECD markets and substitute for them competitors from other OECD countries with 
the closest factor endowments to those of the industrializing countries. France, 
which is a large exporter of textiles and clothing, is one of these OECD countries 
which benefits indirectly the most from such protection. Large French exports of 
apparel to the other OECD zone may thus  mirror the OECD pattern of protection as  
well as her relative endowments. A similar argument could be made about protec- 
tion in agriculture and French agricultural exports to the EC. 
Table 8 also confirms that France tends to export low-skill-intensive products 
to  the EC and the other OECD zones. This result holds for the other OECD zone for 
every year irrespective of whether services are included or excluded (though services 
tend to reduce the strength of the result). The conclusion is less stable for the EC 
than for the other OECD trading partners, in particular when services are excluded. 
In sharp contrast with this feature of French trade with industrial countries, France 
tends to export goods and services which are relatively skill intensive to the ROW 
zone. This conclusion is relatively stable and it is more marked when services are 
included. 
In sum,  these results confirm that France is not the  country with the highest 
relative endowment in skilled labour. Compared with its OECD trading partners 
(among which there are all the skill-rich countries), France tends to rely on relatively 
low-skill-intensive exports. When facing industrializing or developing countries 
which are relatively rich in unskilled labour, France tends to export high-skill- 
intensive exports. 
Terms of trade and relative wages 
Examining the impact of the terms of trade on relative wages requires some 
estimate of the changes in the relative prices of traded goods and services which 
have triggered changes in relative factor rewards (as is well known, fixed relative 
prices of traded goods and services and fixed technology lead to constant relative 
factor rewards, as in the Rybczynski case).I4 Figure 2 suggests that the French terms 
of trade improved between 1984 and 1991 - with most of the increase occurring 
between 1984 and 1986 (and essentially because the relative prices of imported 
goods decreased). 
The analytical framework 
Examining the impact of the terms of trade on French relative wages also 
requires an analytical framework which is better adapted than the traditional factor 
price equalisation theorem. In what follows, we assume some "specificity" (different 
rates of adjustment) for different types of labour (supposed to be the only factor). 
More precisely, we rely upon the following hypothesis: skilled labour is specific to /106 
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Figure 2. French terms of trode 
100 = 1980 loo= 1980 
122 , , 122 
INSEE. all 
...... ........ . . ........ 
94 94 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Source: OECD. 
the  sector where it works, whereas unskilled labour is assumed to be mobile 
between all sectors. 
It must  be recognised that this working hypothesis can be criticised on several 
grounds: labour regulations (such as the minimum wage or employment protection 
legislation) also create rents which tend to limit the potential mobility of unskilled 
labour; some skills (for instance, managerial skills) can be more flexible than 
technical skills (skilled managers could be more mobile between sectors than 
skilled engineers); higher skills may be associated with better capacities to learn, 
thus  with more flexibility, etc. Because of lack of information (for instance, on the 
proportion of managers compared with engineers in the skilled labour force, on the 
proportion of older workers with different skills, etc.) the working hypothesis cannot 
be tested directly on the data used in this paper.15 However, the results presented 
below are consistent with the hypothesis that skilled labour is more sector-specific 
than unskilled labour in the French case. 
I f  factors are sector-specific to a different extent (adjust at different speeds), 
economic analysis shows that changes in the terms of trade will trigger magnified 
reactions of the factor rewards of the specific factors (see Annex for details). For 
instance, improved terms of trade will have the following consequences: wages paid 
to skilled labour by export industries will improve by more than export prices; 
wages paid to skilled labour used in import-competing industries will decline by 
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more than import prices; and wages paid to unskilled (and mobile between indus- 
tries) labour will stay within the range set by the changes of the export and import 
prices. 
In sum, the analytical framework and the hypothesis adopted about the relative 
specificity of skilled versus unskilled labour predict that the difference between the 
growth rate of the wages paid to skilled labour by French export industries and the 
growth rate of the wages paid to skilled labour by French import-competing sectors 
would be positive, and that the differential would be highest for the highest skill 
category and decrease as the level of skill  diminishes - for a given level of experi- 
ence (age). It is also expected that the bulk of this change would have occurred 
between 1984 and 1986 (when the terms of trade improved strongly). Lastly, it is 
expected that the wages paid by French export and import-competing industries to 
unskilled labour would be broadly similar. 
Evidence 
Table 9 aims at testing these predictions. It gives the changes (between 
1984 and 1991) of French relative wages by skill and experience (based on detailed 
data by industry. sex, skills and experience kindly made available by INSEE and 
described in more detail in the annex). For each year, industries have been aggre- 
gated into export, import-competing and non-trading industries according to the 
sectoral trade balances observed for the year involved. However, the results of 
Table 9 are only based on export and import-competing sectors. As a result, they de 
fact0 cover only manufacturing sectors because evidence about services is rather 
unclear.16 
Concerning male wages, Table 9 provides two interesting results. First, it shows 
that growth differentials between skilled labour wages in the  export and import- 
competing industries fit the predictions of the standard trade theory only for two 
groups of workers, i.e. the segments 111 and 1V of the male workers who are aged 
36-45 and 46-55 years old. The wage growth differentials are highest for managers 
(roughly 15 per cent over eight years) and they decline as skills decrease. The bulk 
of the relative changes in wages occurs between 1984 and 1986 (that is, the period 
during which French terms of trade changed the most). Lastly, the differentials 
between the growth rates of the wages paid to unskilled labour by the export and 
the import-competing industries are very small (this last result is consistent with 
the choice of skilled labour as the specific factor of production). 
Second, Table 9 suggests that domestic features of the French labour market 
are much stronger than the trade impact in the three remaining segments of the 
labour market: segments I and 11 of male workers (aged 18-25 and 26-35 years old, 
respectively) and segment V of male workers (older than 55 years).I7 
The case of segment V is consistent with the expected impact of existing early 
retirement schemes. These schemes offer the possibility of paying a reduced por- 
tion of wages to workers who accept a reduction of their working time. As the 1108 
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Table 9. The evolution of relative w a g e s  
Differentials between the growth rates of wages in the export 
and import-competing industries (1984-1991) 
Levels of skills 
Levels of experiencea 
I I1 111 IV V 
18-25 years 26-35 years 36-45 years 46-55 vears > 56 vears 
Males 
Managers 
High level staff 
Medium level staff 
Low level staff 
Workers 
Females 
Managers 
High level staff 
Medium level staff 
Low level staff 
Workers 
51.8 
4 . 7  
1 .1  
-4.0 
-4. I 
66.7 
4 7 . 3  
3.5 
-5.3 
-5.4 
4 7 . 9  
-2.2 
I .7 
2.1 
0.2 
-54.3 
-8.2 
- 1.1 
-8.0 
-3.8 
15.8 
3.6 
- 1 .o 
1.4 
1.5 
-8.5 
-12.0 
-3.6 
-8.3 
0.9 
15.0 
4.5 
0. I 
-5.2 
-0.0 
102.4 
8. I 
-0.6 
-8.2 
-1.7 
-8.6 
-2.3 
-5.2 
-22.0 
- 1 1.2 
-4.4 
-17.3 
5.1 
-8.6 
-4.4 
aj Levels of experience are measured by age. 
Source: INSEE, DADS. Author’s computations. 
portion of the retained wage is higher than the reduction of the working time, these 
retirement schemes are equivalent to increases of real hourly wages. Such schemes 
are likely to be more intensively used in import-competing industries which have to 
restructure than in export sectors which have benefitted from growth. It is also likely 
that these schemes are more intensively used by unskilled workers and that they are 
less generously granted to the higher levels of skills. Lastly, the fact that the wage 
growth differential for low-level staff is negative already in the segment IV {-5.2 per 
cent) is not inconsistent with the previous relations.I8 
The case of segments I and I I  may be related to another feature of the French 
labour market, namely minimum wage reg~1ations.l~ By contrast to the retirement 
schemes which target import-competing (contracting) industries, the SMlC covers 
both export and import-competing sectors. The question is thus to know whether 
the SMlC has a greater influence on import-competing industries than on export 
sectors - hence weakening the expected wage differentials. Data from French Minis- 
try of Labour show in 1993 that SMIC earners represented 5.6 per cent of the labour 
force in industries we classify as import-competing sectors compared with 4.4 per 
cent in industries we classify as export sectors. INSEE data show that “unskilled 
workers” (ouvriers non qualifib) represent 17 per cent of jobs in our import- 
competing sectors compared with 14.7 per cent in our export sectors.20 That may 
explain why segments I and I 1  do not show the pattern of skilled/unskilied wage 
differentials suggested by the specific-factors model. 1091 
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Concerning female wages, Table 9 provides broadly similar, though less clear, 
results. The major difference with male wages is that domestic features dominate all 
the segments of the labour markets but one (segment IV). 
In sum,  Table 9 leads to the conclusion that, when disaggregated by skill level 
and gender, the evolution of French relative wages (in terms of skills) appears to be 
more influenced by domestic features of the labour market than by trade flows. The 
sole exceptions to this are the central segments of the work force (persons aged 
between 36 and 56 years old). In these two segments, skilled labour employed by 
export industries gains whereas skilled labour employed by import-competing 
industries loses (in relative wage terms). It should be kept in mind that these 
evolutions are the necessary signals for a reallocation of the French labour force 
which takes into account changing relative world prices. 
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, AND JOBS 
The heated debate about France's signature of the Uruguay Round reached a 
peak with the arguments about "d6localisation". This issue centred on the fear that 
French outward FDI was worsening the allegedly negative trade impact on the 
number of jobs (and on relative wages). 
Figure 3 helps to understand the emergence of this fear. It shows that it is only 
recently that outward FDI flows have become a noticeable feature of the French 
Figure 3. FDI shares in gross domestic investment 
FDI (% French GDI) FDI @ French GDI) 
13 13 
12 12 
I1 I I  
10 10 
9 9 
8 8 
7 7 
6 6 
5 5 
4 4 
3 
2 
I I 
3 
2 
1973 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 
1110 Source: OECD. 
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economy. Until 1986, outward FDI was insignificant (it represented less than 3 per 
cent of domestic gross investment defined by the "formation brute de capital fixe") 
whereas since 1986, French outward FDI has accounted for 8 to 12 per cent, with a 
peak in 1990. 
However, Figure 3 also shows that inward FDI has followed the same evolution 
as outward FDI flows. After some lags between 1986 and 1990, the inward FDI share 
of domestic gross investment has converged towards the outward FDI share since 
1991. The imbalance between inward and outward flows was never larger than 7 per 
cent of French gross domestic investment, and it declined to  less than 2 per cent of 
domestic investment in 1992. These features were generally ignored in the French 
debate about outward FDI flows. As well as neglecting inward FDI flows by its 
misplaced focus on outward FDI, the "d6locaiisation" debate has also ignored the 
relative importance by industry of the outward FDI flows. 
This section examines three issues. First, it provides some basic evidence 
about relationships between (inward and outward) FDI and gross domestic invest- 
ment by industry. Second, it looks at the FDI geographical patterns by industry - in 
particular, checking whether import-competing industries have FDI patterns differ- 
ent from other French industries. Lastly, it provides some evidence about the 
relationships between FDI and structural changes in jobs by industry. 
The section is based on detailed data about FDI by industry from the Balance 
of Payments statistics which are available only for the period 1989-92. As annual 
data on such a short period are not very meaningful. the section relies on averages 
over the four years As usually in Balance of Payments statistics, data are in terms of 
flows and they concern residents and non-residents. This last point is crucial for a 
correct interpretation of the results provided below. they capture the relations 
between French savings and their use for investment purposes either in France or in 
the rest of the world. They do not capture the investment strategies of French (or 
foreign) multinationals which could (and indeed, do) rely on funds which are 
available elsewhere. 
Capital flows and gross investment by industry 
Table 10 presents French gross domestic investment and FDI for 38 industries 
(goods and private as well as public services).21 It provides three results. 
First, even during these peak years (1989-92) the share of outward FDI relative 
to domestic gross investment by industry is on average small: 1 1  per cent for the 
whole French economy, 16 per cent for manufacturing as a whole and 12 per cent for 
services (excluding retail and wholesale, and public services). 
Second. these shares vary widely among industries: ranging from almost zero 
for agriculture, coal, and several services (such as hotels or consumers services) to 
very high percentages (50 per cent and more) for some industries (oil and gas or 
ferrous metals) and services (business services or insurance and banking 
services).22 It is interesting to note that those industries which have been the most 
vocal in the French debate about "d6localisation" and protection are not among the 111 
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Table 10. Outward and inward foreign direct investment ( I  988-92) 
Per cent of Gross Domestic Investmenta 
Industries 
Outward FDI 
World ECC OtherC DAEsC RRoW' 
TO1 Agriculture 
TO2 Meat and milk 
TO3 Other food manuf. 
TO4 Coal and coke 
TO5 Oil 
TO6 Utilities 
TO7 Ferrous metals 
TO8 Non ferrous metals 
TO9 Mat. construction 
TI0 Glass 
TI I Basic chemicals 
TI 2 Other chemicals 
TI 3 Foundries 
TI4 Machinery 
TI 5a Professional electronics 
TI 56 Consumers electronics 
TI6 Cars, transport rnach. 
TI7 Aircraft, ships 
TI8 Textile. clothing 
TI9 Leather, shows 
T20 Wood, furniture 
T21 Paper, board 
T22 Publishing 
T23 Rubber products 
T24 Construction 
T25-8 Wholesale, retail 
T29 Car retail, garage 
T30 Hotels. restaurants 
T31 Transportation serv. 
T32 Telecoms, mail 
T33 Business services 
T34 Consumers services 
T35 Housing 
T36 Insurance 
T37 Financial services 
T38 Public services 
Total 
Industry [NAP 2.3.7-23) 
Services (NAP 25-37) 
0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 
2.4 1.7 0.6 0.0 
18.3 13.9 3.5 0.1 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
59.0 4.7 13.9 0.5 
4.3 2.9 0.9 0.0 
47.0 37.9 8.1 0.0 
6.5 2.8 2.0 0.0 
25.4 7.5 12.6 0.2 
7.1 1.4 5.5 0.3 
11.4 9.3 0.6 0.1 
21.8 7.3 3.7 0.3 
5.2 3.4 1.5 0.1 
19.3 10.9 1.7 0.4 
35.5 23.3 6.9 0.4 
8.6 7.1 0.2 0.1 
22.4 6.0 15.9 0.0 
14.9 9.7 1.6 0.1 
14.8 8.4 3.6 0.7 
3.2 1.3 1.3 0.3 
3.2 1.9 0.7 0.0 
5.6 3.2 1.8 0.0 
10.6 4.2 6.1 0.0 
12.2 10.4 0.9 0.5 
7.9 4.1 2.1 0.0 
8.1 5.7 1.5 0.1 
0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 
1.7 1 .1  0.5 0.0 
1.2 0.8 0.2 0.0 
0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 
76.9 48.8 24.4 0.4 
1.4 0.7 0.6 0.0 
0.4 0.3 0.1 0.0 
62.5 45.9 11.8 0.4 
76.9 50.1 19.7 1.2 
2.8 1.8 0.7 0.0 
11.0 6.6 3.1 0.1 
16.1 9.0 4.8 0.2 
12.1 7.8 3.5 0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.9 
0.0 
39.8 
0.4 
I .O 
1.7 
5.1 
0.0 
1.3 
10.5 
0.2 
6.3 
4.8 
1.1 
0.5 
3.5 
2.1 
0.3 
0.6 
0.6 
0.3 
0.3 
1.8 
0.8 
0.0 
0. I 
0.1 
0.0 
3.3 
0.2 
0.0 
4.5 
5.9 
0.3 
1.1 
2. I 
0.7 
a l  Gross domestic investment is defined as "formation brute d e  caDital fii 
Inward FDI 
World ECc OtherC D A B C  RRoWc 
0.4 0.3 
0.3 0.2 
14.3 13.4 
0.8 0.0 
1.8 0.5 
0.2 0.1 
,5.3 3.1 
2.0 1.6 
10.7 6.5 
1.9 1.1 
22.2 17.7 
26.5 16.3 
4.3 2.9 
20.3 9.0 
15.5 11.2 
3.3 2.4 
21.8 4.2 
8.1 7.9 
8.2 3.7 
4.4 0.1 
4.0 2.9 
19.2 11.4 
5.3 3.2 
5.7 3.8 
1.3 0.7 
1 1 . 1  6.0 
10.7 4.4 
2.0 0.8 
1.2 1.0 
0.0 0.0 
31.2 20.8 
1.3 0.8 
0.4 0.2 
50.9 48.8 
30.2 14.2 
6.9 4.1 
6.8 4.2 
12.3 7.3 
6.2 3.9 
0.1 0.0 
0.1 0.0 
0.7 0.0 
0.8 0.0 
1.3 0.0 
0.1 0.0 
0.4 0.8 
0.3 0.0 
4.1 0.0 
0.8 0.0 
3.6 0.0 
5.2 0.0 
0.7 0.0 
7.4 2.1 
2.7 0.0 
0.9 0.0 
17.6 0.0 
0.1 0.0 
3.0 0.1 
4.3 0.0 
1.0 0.0 
7.8 0.0 
1.9 0.0 
1.3 0.0 
0.3 0.0 
3.4 0.3 
6.0 0.0 
0.3 0.3 
0.2 0.0 
0.0 0.0 
7.6 0.4 
0.4 0.0 
0.1 0.0 
2.0 0.0 
3.9 0.5 
2.0 0.4 
1.8 0.1 
4.1 0.1 
1.4 0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.9 
0. I 
0.2 
0.0 
I .O 
5.0 
0.7 
I .8 
I .6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.4 
0.0 
0.1 
0.0 
0.2 
0.6 
0.3 
1.5 
0.2 
0.7 
0.1 
0.0 
2.3 
0. I 
0.1 
0. I 
11.7 
0.4 
0.7 
0.7 
0.8 
lin FF millionsl 
bj Shares of FDI {foreign direct investment) are in percentage of gross domestic investments. 
CJ EC: European Community 12. O t h e r  Other OECD. DAEs: Dynamic Asian Economies. RRoW: ROW excluding DAEs. 
Source: Banque d e  France. Cornptabilite nationale. Author's computations. 
The impon oftrode and capitol movements on labour: evidence on the french case 
most active investors in foreign countries: consumer electronics, textiles and cloth- 
ing, wood and furniture, leather and shoes exhibit shares of outward FDI with 
respect to gross domestic investment which are lower than the average share for the 
manufacturing sector as  a whole. 
Lastly, against a background of inward FDI flows that are globally smaller than 
outward FDI, there is a noticeable difference between the manufacturing sector 
(inward FDI is 75 per cent of outward FDI) and the services sector (the correspond- 
ing ratio is 50 per cent). Inward FDI flows are also less concentrated by individual 
sector than the corresponding outward FDI flows. It is interesting to note that job- 
losing industries receive substantial inward FDI flows: these flows are even larger 
than outward FDI flows for some import-competing industries (leather and shoes, 
wood and furniture). 
Geographical patterns of FDI flows by industry 
The French debate about “ddocalisation” has focused almost completely on 
investment (funded by French savings) in countries with low wages. It is thus  worth 
checking whether a significant share of the French outward FDI is going to such 
countries, and, if so, whether this phenomenon is more marked for import-compet- 
ing industries which exhibit high net losses in terms of jobs. Table 10 provides two 
answers to these questions. 
First, the geographical pattern of French outward FDI is very similar to that of 
French merchandise trade. Most of the outward FDI is exported to the EC and to 
other OECD countries. Less than 20 per cent of outward FDI - i.e. the equivalent of 
barely 3 per cent of French gross domestic investment - goes to non-OECD coun- 
tries. Thus, the idea that “dklocalisation” represents a great threat to the French 
industrial base is not substantiated by the facts. 
Second, it is essential to note that the geographical pattern of outward FDI is 
broadly the same for all French industries. In particular, labour-intensive industries 
do not exhibit an outward FDI pattern more oriented towards low-wage countries 
than other French industries. For instance, the shares of outward FDI (in French 
gross domestic investment) invested in  non-OECD countries range from 2.8 through 
1.2 to 0.6 per cent for textile and clothing, consumer electronics, and leather and 
shoes or wood and furniture, re~pec t ive ly .~~  
Table 10 also provides some information about the geographical sources of 
inward FDI (though this information is much less easy to interpret than the geo- 
graphical pattern of outward FDI flows because sources of inward FDI may refer to 
the places where financing packages have been arranged rather than the places 
where funds have been effectively raised). With this caveat in mind, inward FDI flows 
come mostly from the EC and other OECD countries. Inward FDI flows from devel- 
oping or newly industrialised countries represent a very small proportion of French 
gross domestic investment in manufacturing, except in ferrous metals, machinery, 
professional electronics, and textile and clothing. 4 
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That outward FDI flows have the same geographical pattern for all industries 
may seem, at a first glance, counter-intuitive. There are several possible explana- 
tions for this fact. Two seem particularly relevant. First, technological and factor 
price changes induce unskilled-labour-intensive industries to evolve towards capital 
or skill-intensive techniques. For instance, clothing can be designed and made 
electronically, and shoes can be manufactured by capital-intensive techniques (glu- 
ing instead of stitching). In such cases, outward FDI flows reveal the appropriate 
technological changes which take place in these industries and which will allow 
their future growth in developed countries. The second explanation is that inputs 
other than the two classical factors of production (capital and labour) may be 
crucial: for instance, gaining good information about markets and their evolution 
(fashion) may require a lot of investment. I f  that is the case, then the large and 
sophisticated markets - the OECD markets - will attract most of the investment, 
even for import-competing and job-losing industries [Oman, 1993). 
Capital flows and jobs 
The debate over "d6localisation" aimed at addressing the issue of the impact 
of outward FDI flows on total employment: do these flows reinforce the allegedly 
negative impact of trade flows on employment? It does not seem very logical to 
limit this kind of question to outward FDI alone, thereby eliminating the possible 
impact of inward FDI on employment. Hence, this section examines this issue by 
combining estimates from the section on the links between trade and total employ- 
ment with available data on French FDI - both inward and outward. 
Table 11 presents the shares of French FDI held by industries grouped by their 
net situation in terms of job losses or gains (as computed in the section on the 
links between trade and total employment, above). It is based on a breakdown of all 
the sectors into four different types: those characterised by large job gains, those 
marked by large job losses and those with relatively small job gains or losses. It 
suggests two results. 
First, outward FDI flows are concentrated in industries exhibiting net job gains. 
This feature is very clear i f  two industries (financial services for investment in the 
EC, and oil and gas extraction for investment in the non-OECD countries) are 
excluded for obvious reasons (the first is related to the Single Market programme 
and the second is related to the location of oil and gas deposits). Table I 1  provides 
no evidence to support the assertion that "d6localisation" is concentrated in indus- 
tries experiencing net job losses. 
Second, inward FDI flows offer a more complex pattern. Inward FDI flows from 
the EC are disproportionately invested in French industries suffering substantial net 
job losses. By contrast, inward FDI flows from non-OECD countries are essentially 
directed to French industries exhibiting net job gains, while inward FDI flows from 
the other OECD countries are in-between. These investment patterns suggest two 
remarks. Inward FDI flows from developed countries seem to be largely consistent 
with the argument that French comparative advantages are complex vis-his other 
OECD countries which are mostly capital and skilled labour-rich countries. By 1114 
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Outward foreign direct investment 
World 13.9 34.2 
EC 21.3 32.0a 
Other OECD 5.4 16.6 
ROW 31.6 38.7 
Inward foreign direct investment 
World 10.9 30.6 
EC 16.3 29.1 
Other OECD 8.6 19.1 
ROW 2.1 2.9 
Table 1 I .  Shares of French foreign direct investment by industry 
ranked by net job gains and losses 
65.8 53.4 
68.0 48.4 
83.4 57.2 
61.3 28.4 
69.4 37.7 
70.9 31.9 
80.9 43.5 
97. I 26.5 
Industries with net job losses I Industries with net job gains 
Trading partners Industries having 
gained more than 
5 000 jobs 
all industries with 
net job losses 
all industries with 
net job gains 
Industries having 
lost more than 
5 000 jobs 
contrast, inward FDI flows from newly developed or developing countries mirror the 
more clear-cut comparative advantages. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the impact of trade and capital movements on French 
employment and relative wages. It provides three results which tend to support 
standard economic analysis. 
First, trade has had, at most, a modest impact on total employment which 
depends more upon macroeconomic factors and policies as well as upon the 
structure of labour and product markets (and the ways in which labour and product 
market policies influence these structures). When the calculations are disaggre- 
gated between skilled and unskilled labour embodied in French trade, this result 
does not change. Contrary to what some observers believe, French exports are not 
particularly skilled-labour intensive compared with the rest of the world. Indeed. 
France is both relatively well endowed with skilled labour vis-his certain trading 
partners (for instance, developing countries) and relatively intensive in unskilled 
labour vis-a-vis other countries (for instance, the major OECD countries). 
Second, trade has had an impact on relative wages: the paper provides evi- 
dence supporting the saying that liberal trade is associated with better jobs rather 
than more jobs, But the paper also shows that the influence of trade on relative -!&? 
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wages was dampened by domestic labour market policies and regulations, espe- 
cially for young workers and for those close to retirement. 
Lastly, the paper shows that focusing on outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) by import-competing industries is misleading: outward FDI is essentially done 
by exporting sectors, and inward FDI (which is broadly of the same magnitude) 
occurs in downsizing industries as well as in the exporting sectors -suggesting that 
French firms ignore opportunities to invest in France that foreign investors find 
profitable. 
The first and third results of this paper are t h u s  close to those provided by the 
existing literature on the US case (Baldwin, 1994). Taking into account the fact that 
French labour markets are characterised by more wage and quantity rigidities than 
US labour markets, this similarity is interesting. It confirms that trade policy is the 
wrong instrument for addressing labour issues, a message particularly useful if one 
takes into account the fact that the United States and France have been among the 
staunchest supporters of the introduction of a "social clause" in the G A T  arena. 
To our knowledge, the existing literature on the US case has not examined the 
relationship between trade and labour in a factor-specific environment which sup- 
ports our second result. It would be interesting to see to which extent a crude 
method, like the one used in this paper, would provide similar or dissimilar results 
in  an economy where labour market flexibility is more marked. 
NOTES 
I .  
2. 
3.  
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
I I. 
See the Arthuis Report (1993) which was prepared by a member of the French Senate. 
For an opposite stance, see the Devedjian Report (I 993). 
For a more detailed analysis of the relations between trade and factor movements, see 
Faini and Venturini (I 993). 
Beyond these results of pure trade theory, economists tend to see trade as an engine of 
growth - a dynamic element of competition powerful enough to generate new jobs in 
the national economy (Edwards, 1993). However, the limited period for which data are 
available suggests that this argument should be put to one side in the context of this 
paper. 
The year I976 has been chosen as the starting point because it is the f i rs t  year with the 
French unemployment rate higher than 3 per cent (its average during the 20 previous 
years). 
At  the level of disaggregation chosen (81 sectors), French national accounts allow to 
take into account requirements in terms of intermediate goods and services - but not in 
terms of capital goods. 
Since 1977, the decline in this ratio mirrors the increasing role of exports in French 
GDP. 
For the sake of simplicity, Table 3 does not show the number of export-supported jobs 
related t o  trade with the OPEC countries. Jobs supported by French exports to OPEC 
countries can be computed by subtracting the amount of export-supported jobs related 
to the zones shown in Table 3 from the total amount of export-supported jobs provided 
by Table I. 
The same observation can be drawn from the results obtained in the United States by 
Borjas et 01. (I 99 I). 
Intra-industry trade opens the possibility of a more complex picture at a more disaggre- 
gated level of sectors than the 81 industries considered here. 
Indeed, Krugman and Lawrence (I 993) have shown that in the US case, factor price 
equalisation is dominated by more powerful domestic causes. 
Indeed, such changes are observed by Borjas et of. in the US case: the implicit labour 
input in US exports is higher in efficiency units than in jobs, and the implicit labour input 
in US imports is lower. 117( 
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12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
l,ls 
Table 8 excludes agriculture (but not food industries) because wage data are not very 
reliable for this sector. 
The wage differentials are smaller when services are included. That may be due to the 
fact that services are protected and workers in these sectors can share in the associated 
rents. 
That remains true when the recent empirical literature has also added immigration in a 
relatively straightforward manner: the entry of more low-skilled immigrants is assumed 
to  depress unskilled wages relatively to skilled wages. Again, however, a simple Heck- 
scher-Ohlin model based on skilled and unskilled labour shows that this is not the case 
unless the terms of trade vary. 
Again, what counts is not the absolute specificity of each factor, but the fact that some 
factors are assumed to be less mobile than others. Kraft (I 994) found that German data 
(1965-90) show a negative correlation between skilled workers and mobility (as sug- 
gested by the human capital theory). 
Only four service sectors may be considered as tradables (two as exportables and two 
as importables). 
It should be emphasized that segment I accounts for a small share of the French work 
force. 
It may suggest that these schemes are already shaping labour markets for employees 
aged between 45 and 55 years old (probably between 50 and 55 years old). 
The impact of the minimum wage regulation on French employment has been thor- 
oughly analyzed. See Rosa (I 985) and Bazen and Martin (I 99 I). 
These figures are unweighted averages of the shares by sector provided by INSEE 
FDI flows differ from gross domestic investment flows because they are also used to 
finance other purposes, in particular mergers and acquisitions. 
These high figures (50 per cent and more) require some explanations. In manufacturing, 
there are only two cases (oil and non-ferrous mining) which are easy to explain: they 
clearly correspond to the absence of the raw materials in question in France. In the case 
of services, there are two plausible explanations. The ways data are recorded by the 
Banque de France may aggregate capital flows from some industries with capital flows of 
the services industry involved - in particular, for banking and insurance services. The 
other explanation is the huge foreign investments made by French banks and insurance 
companies in order to  adjust to  the Single Market exercise. 
It may be argued that this result mirrors a statistical problem due to the fact that 
Table I0 aggregates capital and labour-intensive industries together (for instance, tex- 
tiles and clothing). However, additional computations concerning the geographical FDI 
pattern at a higher level of disaggregation (81 industries) confirm the results of Table 10. 
( I  993). 
Annex 
METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
Standard trade propositions 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model is based the assumption of perfect 
factor mobility among sectors. It predicts the following "magnification" effect of the 
link between factor and product prices: 
1 1 1  
where p, is the price of the good intensive in skilled labour, w, the wage paid to 
skilled labour, w, the wage paid to unskilled labour, and pu the price of the good 
intensive in unskilled labour. 
The specific-factor model (Jones, 1971) is based on imperfect factor mobility 
among sectors. It predicts the following magnification effect: 
w, > P, > w, > P, > w, 121 
where x and m refer to the exported and imported goods, and w, and w, to the 
skilled labour forces used in  the exporting and import-competing sectors, 
respectively. 
w, > P, > P, > w, 
Methodology: a short description 
the employment content of trade according to the following formula: 
Tables 1 to  5 are based on the method suggested by Davis (1992) by computing 
E = 11 - ( 1 - m/s)A]-]*e 131 
where E is the vector of total (direct and indirect) domestic output of goods and 
services required to produce exports, e the direct output required, I the diagonal 
unit matrix, ( 1  - m/s) the diagonal matrix comprising the domestic shares of 
outputs delivered to intersectoral and to  final demands (m is imports and s the 
total supply of outputs), A the direct labour requirements coefficients matrix. 
Sakurai (1993) who has done similar computations on a much more aggregate 
industrial classification gets results for the French economy which are very close to 
our results. 
The methodology used in the Table 7 of the paper combines the approaches 
suggested by Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1991) (hereafter BFK) and by Davis. Follow- 
ing BFK. the implicit labour supply related to trade flows can be expressed as: 
L, = SUMi  (L,t/Qi,)*Ti, = SUM, L it*(Ti,/Qit) 141 1191 
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where L, is the number of employees (adjusted for hours worked) in the industry i ,  
Qi the domestic output of the industry i and Ti the net trade flow (imports minus 
exports) for this industry. All these variables are for the year t (from 1977 until 
1992). When Ti, corresponds to net imports of the industry i. L, has a negative sign. 
When it corresponds to net exports of the industry i. L, has a positive sign. 
BFK then refine their approach by introducing a broad distinction between two 
types of employees: “production workers” and “non-production workers.” In the  
French case, this distinction has been interpreted as that between workers 
(”ouvriers”) and other wage earners. As a result, the implicit supply of each type of 
labour related to trade flows can be expressed as: 
Lit = SUM, Jaii*Lit*(Tit/Qit)j 151 
where aii is the average proportion of employees of type j ( j  = I ,  2 )  by the industry 
during the period examined. 
The second refinement introduced by BFK is the concept of “efficiency units.” 
The number of employees Li is split into 64 efficiency units, according to three 
criteria: sex, skills and experience. In the French case, male and female workers in 
each industry i are divided in six levels of ”socio-professional categories” which are 
the closest proxies for levels of education (managers, high-level staff, medium-level 
staff, low-level staff, workers, apprentices and trainees) and experience (given by 
five age-groups: under 26, from 26 to 35, from 36 to 45. from 46 to 55, above 56). 
Employees from the uni t  u in the industry i were weighted by the average hourly 
wage during the period 1984-91. As a result, the implicit supply of each type of 
labour efficiency unit related to trade flows can be expressed as: 
161 
where e, is the average proportion of employees of type u employed by the  
industry during the period 1984-91 and where Ui, is the total number of labour 
efficiency units used by the industry i. 
The BFK computations are based on total output Oi. Following Davis (1992), 
this paper is based on domestic output Q, only. Before assessing the pros and cons 
of this methodology, it is useful to describe the statistical sources. 
L,, = (l/U)* SUMi Iei,,*Uit*(Ti(Qit)] 
Statistical sources 
Data on output, trade flows and total employment by industry were taken from 
the French National Accounts. The NAP 90 level of the French Industrial Classifica- 
tion (NAP 90) was used. It is a relatively disaggregated level since it distinguishes 
54 agricultural and manufacturing branches and 27 services branches ( the 
9 branches of “public services” have been aggregated into one branch). The  break- 
down of trade flows between trade with the European Community and trade with 
the Rest of the World is also based on the National Accounts for the period 1988-92. 1120 
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For the years 1977-87, this breakdown is based on (unpublished) data processed by 
the Direction de la Prhision of the Ministry of the Economy. 
All the detailed data on employment and wages were kindly provided by the 
Division Emploi of INSEE. Wages include all components (including taxable com- 
pensation) effectively paid after deduction of social charges (for social security, 
unemployment and retirement). As a result, they are taxable wages (except for 
compensations paid in kind). These wages are transformed into average wages by 
taking into account the corresponding number of hours worked. These data were 
available at the level of NAP 40 (based on 38 sectors). 
Data on outward and inward capital flows between 1989 and 1993 were kindly 
provided by the Banque de France. These data, which follow the 1MF guidelines on 
Balance of Payments statistics, were made available in terms of the French indus- 
trial classification (NAP). 
Some limitations of the methodology 
The methodology used in this paper has attracted several criticisms (Cortes et 
lean, 1994). The two most frequent criticisms are as follows: the methodology 
assumes homogeneous domestic and foreign goods; it is based on average and 
static input-output coefficients. It seems to us that none of these criticisms are 
decisive and, as a result, that this methodology can provide acceptable results for 
the French case. 
The homogeneity of the goods included in each industry has two interpreta- 
tions. First, sectors (even in a classification relying on 81 sectors) can be very broad, 
such as, for instance, the sector “machines-outils” or “materiel klectrique”. Second, 
domestically produced and imported goods pertaining to the same sector are 
considered as homogeneous. 
The first dimension is a purely statistical problem which leads to  the following 
question: would a more disaggregated classification provide very different results? 
This paper provides an indirect (though incomplete) answer to this question. In 
order to use the BFK methodology, it was necessary to shift from the NAP 90 classi- 
fication to the NAP 40 classification. However, comparing Table 4 (based on the 81 
NAP 90 sectors) to Table 7 (based on the 38 NAP 40 sectors) shows that the orders 
of magnitude are very close. As a result, it seems unlikely that further disaggrega- 
tion would necessarily lead to very different results. 
The second interpretation of homogeneity implicitly assumes that developing 
countries export low-quality goods and developed countries high-quality goods (as 
indeed implicitly assumed by Mathieu and Sterdyniak, 1994; and Direction de la 
Prhision, 1994). This assumed correlation between labour-intensity and low-quality 
versions of the good concerned on the one hand, and on the other hand between 1211 
OECD Economic Studies No. 24, I99511 
capital-intensity and high-quality of the good in question is far from certain. For 
instance, clothing would provide many counter-examples. 
The second major criticism concerns the fact that the methodology is based on 
average input-output coefficients. It is argued that imports eliminate the least 
efficient plants and exports rely on the most efficient plants (Driver eta/ . ,  1988). As 
a result, marginal input-output coefficients should be used rather than average 
coefficients. Moreover, it is argued that the least efficient plants are labour-inten- 
sive and that the most efficient plants are capital-intensive. 
This criticism could be valid in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson 
framework, with two countries, two goods and two factors of production. It is less 
convincing in a world where it is difficult to locate the relative endowments of a 
country with respect to the others. As suggested in the text, France is likely to  be 
more labour-abundant than some OECD countries, but less labour-abundant than 
the other OECD countries and developing countries. In this case, it seems difficult 
to  assume that firms will always eliminate labour-intensive plants and that exports 
will always be based on capital-intensive plants. 
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